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Implementing strategies to overcome social-ecological traps: the role of
community brokers and institutional bricolage in a locally managed marine
area
Dirk J. Steenbergen 1 and Carol Warren 2
ABSTRACT. We examine collaborative arrangements for resource management between communities and external agencies, with a
particular interest in how community-based interventions are integrated into local contexts. This timely inquiry comes in a period when
participatory resource management approaches are increasingly being applied to overcome the perpetual cycles of poverty in which
poor resource-dependent people find themselves, i.e., social-ecological traps. Much of the literature on social-ecological traps has
focused on identifying conditions, factors, and responses that are important in, for example, alleviating systemic poverty or developing
sustainable resource management systems. However, insufficient focus has been placed on understanding the practical processes by
which strategies are implemented, and how these can reflexively affect the system itself. Drawing from a case study of a locally managed
marine area in Indonesia, we examine the interactions between a nongovernment organization and a target community during the
implementation of a fisheries management plan. Applying insights from rural development studies, we show how external interventions,
designed to pull people out of social-ecological traps, are operationalized into forms that make them locally familiar and appropriate
through actions of community brokers and processes of “institutional bricolage.” We argue that as a consequence of implementing
processes, such interventions should be expected to diverge from their initial science-based justification.
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INTRODUCTION
The recognized need to involve local resource user groups in the
management of economically and ecologically important
resource stocks has propelled participatory resource management
forward as an important modus operandi for development and
conservation agencies (Pomeroy 1995, UNDP 2012). Coastal
zones have gained particular attention following international
commitments made at the UN Ocean Conference in June 2017 to
implement Sustainable Development Goal 14 on sustainable use
of ocean, sea, and marine resources for development (Unger et
al. 2017). In these contexts, coastal resource management projects
across the Asia Pacific are increasingly being implemented under
various comanagement models to deal with challenging local
governance settings (Persoon et al. 2003, Pomeroy et al. 2007,
Foale et al. 2013, Jupiter et al. 2014, Cohen and Steenbergen
2015). These form around collaborations between technical
implementation agencies, typically conservation NGOs and local
resource user groups. Practically, this sees government or NGO
staff  working with local community representatives to
cooperatively implement appropriate interventions that
“sustainabilize” human-environment resource systems (Wamukota
et al. 2012).  
The work plans that guide these collaborations are informed by
rich bodies of science that seek to improve the way resources are
governed and managed (Clifton 2009). Thinking around social-
ecological systems, for example, has done much to shift practice
toward applying more holistic approaches that frame resource
management as interactions between social and ecological
systems (Berkes et al. 2002, Olsson et al. 2004). The often wicked
problems around resource management (Jentoft and
Chuenpagdee 2009), and the precarious situations in which poor
coastal communities find themselves, have usefully been framed
as social-ecological (SE) traps (Cinner 2011, Kittinger et al. 2013,
Boonstra and de Boer 2014). Such traps may occur where high
levels of poverty drive resource exploitation beyond sustainable
levels, producing positive feedback loops in the form of higher
food insecurity (Laborde et al. 2016). Diminishing catch in turn
jeopardizes long-term sustenance of resource dependent people,
thus threatening further descent into poverty. To avoid SE traps,
and achieve key sustainability outcomes, proponents of the
systems approach urge the need to strengthen local resilience and
adaptive management capacity (Berkes et al. 2002, Olsson et al.
2004, Folke et al. 2005, Carpenter and Brock 2008). Much of the
attention in this body of work has therefore focused on
understanding the systems and their interactive dynamics
(Ostrom 2009, McGinnis and Ostrom 2014), and on identifying
considerations that technical interventions (and project designs)
need to account for to overcome poverty traps (Cinner et al. 2012,
Lade et al. 2017).  
Little attention, however, is given to more practical matters of
implementation of these ideas and how influential these very
processes can be in altering the social system and achieving
positive outcomes (or otherwise). Recruitment of community
collaborators, for example, has been shown to significantly
influence levels of participation across different community
groups, in turn determining how benefits are distributed, conflicts
are resolved, and ultimately how much support the intervention
gains locally (Steenbergen and Visser 2016). In their more holistic
conceptualization of poverty trap dynamics, Haider et al. (2018)
identify key aspects influencing trap dynamics, including in
particular external drivers, in addition to cross-scale interactions,
path dependencies, and social-ecological diversity. They consider
that development interventions themselves can potentially emerge
as such external drivers and counterintuitively, can contribute to
the creation and persistence of poverty among poor resource
users. For example, loan interventions aimed at diversification
can reduce resource exploitation, but in turn may leave recipients
in debt, risking downward spiral into further poverty and more
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intensive resource extraction. Critical perspectives on
development and conservation practice as a significant factor
influencing trap dynamics, can be useful for an inquiry into how
external interventions affect a community’s ability to overcome
SE traps.  
In practice, the failure of conservation and development projects
to address sustainability challenges is often associated with
noncompliance or insufficient community support and/or
interest, rather than faulty science (Christie 2004). With many
case studies showing how resource users find themselves in SE
traps that lock them into cycles of poverty and resource
degradation (van Oostenbrugge et al. 2004, Bunce et al. 2009,
Cinner 2011), interventions appear to be repeatedly misfiring. It
is a timely consideration therefore to devote more attention to the
processes by which some of these interventions are implemented.
Better understanding is required of how actions, negotiations,
and relationships among people involved in such implementation
processes affect or alter the system itself, regardless of the science
behind the intervention. This requires a reflective perspective on
the process of implementation and in doing so a critical
examination of a priori project design. Boonstra et al. (2016:886)
propose that, “explanation and conceptualization of the feedback
process between response and opportunities (or between ‘agency’
and ‘structure’) are major themes in social sciences ... and can be
used ... to better understand why and how SE traps are
transformed or reproduced.”  
Perspectives from anthropology, development studies, and critical
institutionalism therefore offer enriching insights into how
translation of project objectives into desired impact often hinges
on how effectively it integrates into existing socially complex
networks of relationships, accountabilities, and interests (Brosius
2006). In noting that external projects are largely informed by
dominant policy narratives (Clifton and Foale 2017, Steenbergen
et al. 2017a), understanding the agency of project benefactors is
imperative. Building on the recognition that the social-political
fabric of communities highly influences resource-use practices
(Prescott et al. 2015), we argue that thinking must be extended to
include an appreciation that these relationships also form critical
vehicles for change. Interactions between project managers and
community representatives critically determine how projects
operate locally, and whether common understanding across
disciplines, worldviews, cultures, and social status distinctions is
achieved.  
With this study we seek to show how externally facilitated project
implementation in itself  is a system altering process, regardless of
the predefined objective of an intervention. We are therefore
primarily interested in understanding how development and
conservation interventions are delivered, and come to impact
upon pathways out of SE traps, rather than the common focus
on what is delivered to do so. We focus on the role of local
facilitating agents (“brokers”) who are able to translate project
resources into something that is locally salient and, in that process,
facilitate local structural adjustments (“institutional bricolage”),
which may or may not align with the initial project objectives.
Critical institutionalist perspectives
Literature on commons management has largely been geared
toward finding suitable conditions in which to build institutions
that can facilitate effective resource governance (Ostrom 1990,
Wade 1994, Baland and Platteau 1996, Ostrom et al. 2002). In
that respect it formed foundational work that later fed into
systems thinking around natural resource management (Berkes
et al. 2002). These perspectives, however, worked on a general
assumption that institutions can be constructed or engineered to
fit a particular objective given the right conditions. A critical
institutionalist perspective challenges these assumptions. In her
work on communal water resource management in East Africa,
Cleaver (2001) argues for an “institutional bricolage” approach
that recognizes the often ad hoc, informal, and multivalent aspects
of decision-making processes. She builds her fundamental
criticism of the functionalist notion that “crafting of institutions
suggests that specific institutions are deliberately developed for
particular functions,” and suggests in contrast that “collective
action institutions may be multipurpose, management may be
both intermittent and robust, an integral part of social relations
and a negotiated result of active assemblage” (Cleaver 2001:29
[emphasis in original]). As the French word bricolage suggests,
the concept conceives of institutions and their agents as creative
and resourceful in their use of what is available (Cleaver 2012),
and much more ad hoc than institutional engineering might
suggest. She defines the conception of bricolage to mean the
“adaptive processes by which people imbue configurations of
rules, traditions, norms and relationships with meaning and
authority. In doing so they modify old arrangements and invent
new ones but innovations are always linked authoritatively to
acceptable ways of doing things” (Cleaver 2012:34). For the
purposes of this study, Cleaver’s attention to the dynamic and
contextual functioning of local institutions provides a fruitful way
of looking at complex structural influences on resources
management.
Agency perspectives
To develop a deeper appreciation for the individual’s role, work
in development sociology also provides constructive insights.
Norman Long’s (2001) actor-oriented approach to studying
development practice proposes an analytical framework based on
the premise that social life is heterogeneous and multifaceted. He
argues that people rarely act alone and social action is never an
entirely ego-centered endeavor. Actions are embedded in
networks of people (Fafchamps 2006), influenced by routine, and
bounded by structural convention and culture (Arce and Long
2000). At the same time, although meanings and values may be
culturally constructed they are differentially applied by
individuals (Long 2001). Long notes that if  we are to understand
the continuing failures of development (and conservation)
programs we need to focus on the social process and not just on
the structural outcomes.  
In examining an NGO’s engagement with one community, we
focus on the social spaces where people from different
backgrounds meet in negotiations over resource management.
Our primary interest is twofold, namely in how interactions take
place and who acts in these spaces. Therefore, processes of
mediation, and the role of brokers, are important to clarify
conceptually. Where Long identifies acts of mediation to be
carried out by generic mediators, we borrow De Sardan’s (2005)
more nuanced conceptualization of brokers. He understands the
process of mediation to involve “[i]nteractions between the
developmentalist configuration and ... populations ..., [which]
develop via discreet passageways, relays, extended or restricted
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networks of transmission, interfaces. This is fundamentally a
process that relies on mediation, which proceeds through a wide
range of multiple, embedded, overlapping, intertwined
mediations” (De Sardan 2005:166). Mediation thus requires
particular skills that can negotiate social-ecological complexity
and translate ideas, concepts, and information from a contextually
alien form to one that is understandable and usable.  
Brokers can thus be understood to be community members that
function (or are taken to function) as representatives of the
community, or a particular constituency, and in that role maintain
useful relationships across social spaces (James 2011, Morgan-
Trimmer 2014). In the context of project implementation, they
represent the local social recipients as interlocutors of
information, support, and financial aid structures. It is important
to note that brokers do not operate as objective, unattached, and
neutral agents, nor do individuals simply appear in these
positions. Brokers constantly negotiate private as well as public
interests and accordingly may seek to exploit outside resources
for the wider community and/or for themselves in their role as
intermediaries (Mosse and Lewis 2006). Emerging from the social
context of the communities they are a part of, implies that
dynamic power relations and complex social orders affect who
arrives in these positions and how they function in them (Mosse
and Lewis 2006, James 2011). Such dynamics can be highly
influential (Crona et al. 2010) and are thus important to consider
when seeking to instigate changes to a system.
METHODS
For this study we examine how implementation of a community-
based conservation project integrates into existing landscapes of
interests, governance, and local ways of doing things. We follow
the key social paths of relationships that span the interface
between technical agencies and the community, through which
project resources and information are passed. Using a mixed
method qualitative approach (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004),
we draw from a case study of a locally managed marine area
(LMMA) in Indonesia to make explicit how external (albeit
participatory) projects are accommodated by local brokers who
are recruited to an outside agenda. These agents must be
understood to operate in an ambivalent space where they remain
part of the local social system while trying to negotiate and adapt
the ideas, principles, and concepts of sustainable resource
management into the community sphere. Our case study approach
offers rich insights into the kind of social dynamics taking place
behind project implementation and provides in-depth
perspectives that large-sampled quantitative studies over broad
contexts may otherwise lack (Stake 1995).
Study site: Tanimbar Kei, Southeast Maluku
Tanimbar Kei island is located in the Kei Archipelago that falls
under the administration of Southeast Maluku district in Maluku
province, eastern Indonesia (Fig. 1). In part because of the island’s
remoteness, the estimated 500 people living across the > 120
households making up the island’s only community (Kecamatan
Kei Kecil Barat 2010) all show high dependence on the immediate
marine environment for their livelihoods. Harvests from seaweed
farming, shark fishing, and copra production provide necessary
income to pay for children’s off-island secondary education,
healthcare costs, dietary supplements like rice, and other
household expenses (Steenbergen et al. 2017b). Given the lack of
cool storage and distance from the market, small scale fishing
activities contribute largely to subsistence needs. The most
significant fishing pressure is from seasonal outside fishers
participating in economically attractive fisheries around
Tanimbar Kei. Participation in these fisheries requires skills and
gear that Tanimbar Kei fishers at large do not have nor show
interest in acquiring. Despite evidence of the reaches of
globalization, accelerated by the expansion in recent years of
mobile telephone networks connecting the island to the mainland,
the community still upholds a very strong customary (adat)
system. This system is strongly dictated by traditional law and
social structures in the community (for more detailed accounts of
traditional social structures of Tanimbar Kei refer to Barraud
1979).
Fig. 1. Map of the Kei Islands in Southeast Maluku district
(Indonesia), indicating the location of Tanimbar Kei as the
study site (embedded box).
Since 2006 the community on Tanimbar Kei has been in
collaboration with an external NGO under a comanagement
arrangement. Through technical facilitation by the NGO the
community project has established a resource management plan
around a legally recognized LMMA. The community project is
led by a conservation team, which in turn is headed by three
project coordinators. Like all the conservation team members, the
coordinator positions can only be occupied by members of the
community. Such management principles were agreed upon in
early project inception and planning meetings involving external
facilitation by NGO staff. The process of appointment follows
consultation with the community at open meetings, in addition
to deliberation with the members of the traditional council. Since
the inception of the community project, coordinators have
rotated; however, all coordinators have been linked through direct
lineage, or are married into, one of the 23 families that make up
the founding customary kinship structure in Tanimbar Kei
(Steenbergen 2016). This traditional core group of families in turn
makes up about 75% of the community. So representing the
cultural norms and rules embodied by this traditional core stands
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as a fundamental responsibility of the coordinators’ leadership
positions in the project.
Data collection
This research built on the lead author’s long-term engagement
since 2009 with the small community on the island of Tanimbar
Kei (Steenbergen 2016, Warren and Visser 2016, McCarthy et al.
2017, Steenbergen et al. 2017b). For this particular study, data
collection took place between 2014 and 2017 during frequent
visits to the island, ranging between two to four weeks. The
ethnographic research approach applied qualitative mixed-
methods to data collection organized over three phases. Given the
key focus on agency of particular people, data collection in the
latter phases involved information-oriented sampling (Flyvbjerg
2006), with interview subjects selected on the basis of their known
role as either technical facilitators or community representatives.
All interviews were carried out in Bahasa Indonesia, in the
company of research assistants from the village for appropriate
cultural and local language facilitation.  
The first phase sought to (i) understand the local governance
context of the village and (ii) identify what interests and values
people associated with the community LMMA project.
Randomized household surveys (n = 43) enquired about
participation, leadership, and governance in the village, and also
included questions to gauge the extent of villagers’ general
knowledge of the project. These gave us a cross section
background understanding of village attitudes and local
dynamics. These were followed by a first round of in-depth
semistructured interviews carried out with key informants from
the village (n = 6) selected based on their involvement as leaders
in the LMMA village project, including the three brokers. These
interviews inquired into who were influential decision-making
figures in the community, what local interests were most
important at a community level, and whether these interests were
perceived to be compatible, or in competition, with those of
external actors. Participant observations during community
meetings and project implementation activities provided
important supplementary data on how decisions were made and
what kind of local interests were perceived to be important.  
The second phase of data collection focused on what various
outcomes the community project had delivered to date as
perceived by different key implementing actors, including the
facilitating NGO staff  and the interface actors (brokers). First, a
review was carried out of documented project outputs in the form
of community-based management plans, and published and
unpublished reporting material from the NGO. Six main project
objectives of the fisheries management component were
identified, including (i) ensuring fishery management capacity,
(ii) enforcement of spatial fishery management / access rules, (iii)
enforcement of fishing quotas, (iv) enforcement of gear
restrictions, (v) enforcement of species targeting, and (vi)
management of income from fisheries management. These were
used as a reference to gauge differences between intended
outcomes versus actual outcomes. This fed into a second round
of in-depth semistructured interviews that were carried out with
the community interface brokers (n = 3) and staff  from the NGO
(n = 3). These questioned how the project implementation
processes addressed both parallel and conflicting interests
between the NGO and the community.  
The third phase involved a final series of in-depth data-
verification interviews (n = 6) with previously interviewed key
informants operating in the community-NGO interface,
following analysis of data from the first and second phase. These
interviews were structured around questions of “how
negotiations over competing interests had led to particular project
outcomes” and “if  local resource use patterns had consequently
changed.” Respondents were asked their opinion on whether
project outcomes had adequately represented local needs and had
addressed the objectives of sustainable management and poverty
alleviation.
RESULTS
Resource governance in Tanimbar Kei
Like many small island communities, the people of Tanimbar Kei
maintain a collective existence in the face of considerable shocks
and shifts to the social-ecological system they are a part of. Strong
mutual support systems and mechanisms for food security and
insurance have become integral parts of the customary value
system on the island. Intricate links with the sea and the social
environment around them are evident in many of the rituals in
Tanimbar Kei and clearly indicate the high value associated with
both natural and cultural resources. With the exception of an
outlying enclave of about 15 households made up of migrant
families, most of Tanimbar Kei’s households subscribed to the
traditional rules, norms, and conduct that make up the central
customary system. Importantly, those migrant households held
no claim to land ownership, and showed very little interest and
low participation in community-level action and decision
making.  
Respondents identified three main institutions in the community
that determined the direction of leadership and decision making:
village administration, traditional (adat), and religious councils.
The village administration and traditional council in particular
assume the most leverage, the former for its connection to central
government and the latter for its representation of local
customary beliefs and norms. Although these two platforms at
times appeared difficult to distinguish for respondents, by and
large the village administration deals with matters of internal and
external governance as part of national structures of government
administration. Conversely, the traditional council tends to deal
with matters of local social order. Over the years individuals have
come to occupy positions simultaneously within both these
structures and therefore play dual leadership roles based on
democratic selection or inherited rights, or both. With the
customary social system having such prominence in day-to-day
village life, it forms a strong local identity and holds a central
normative position based upon which the village leadership
functions. The traditional council embodies customary principles
and operationalizes these by taking advantage of links to external
resources through village administration.
The locally managed marine area comanagement arrangement
With the establishment of the LMMA community project, access
to marine resource stocks is controlled by community leaders
using legitimate authority to sanction offenders under a
subdistrict government endorsement. Enabling this is a set of
community resource management regulations that guide how
resources are accessed and managed. Regulations stipulate limits
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on gear use and catch, prohibitions on capture of particular
species, and restrictions on spatial access to fishing grounds. These
were locally formulated with facilitation of the NGO and signed
by leaders from the village government, traditional council, and
religious council. The NGO’s facilitation extended to gaining
legal endorsement for these rules by subdistrict government,
which at the same time confirmed local customary management
rights.  
The community LMMA project drew from these regulations in
applying a suite of interventions and management measures that
are geared toward developing more sustainable use of resources.
These ranged from developing an environmental curriculum in
the village primary school and management planning for a
seasonal flying-fish fishery, to gazetting no-take areas for
economically important marine resources, e.g., trochus shell and
reef fish, and monitoring their population growth. The
participatory nature of the project resulted in collaborative
planning, implementation, and evaluation, whereby the NGO
sought to align its facilitative role with local interests, culture, and
norms. This participatory management arrangement provided
opportunity for the project to assume a local shape that reflected
interests on the ground. As presented in the next section, this
shaping produced outcomes that deviated from initial expected
project outcomes for fisheries management.
Competing interests in fisheries management
In the important fisheries management component of Tanimbar
Kei’s LMMA project, interventions were developed to progress
the sustainable management of fishery resources around the
island, with the particular objective of providing livelihood
opportunities for Tanimbar Kei people over the long term. The
process of developing these interventions involved deliberation
between external NGO staff  and community brokers, who
became the local coordinators, each representing their
constituency’s set of interests.  
In their technical advisory role external project staff  presented
Western science-based paradigms around sustainable fisheries
management. One NGO staff  noted, their primary objective was
to develop community-based fisheries management systems that
are “beneficial in the short term for those who rightfully depend
on the resource stocks... [and to] ensure that will remain the case
in the future.” An important aspect of that protection implicitly
involved understanding and managing the ecological
components, to which much of the fisheries science speaks. Inputs
from project staff  were therefore geared largely toward technically
guiding the design of interventions so that they could have
predictably positive ecological impacts. Furthermore, standing
relatively separate from the community, external NGO project
staff  were somewhat less predisposed to local social influences
than, for example, the community brokers were. This meant a
second role in the NGO’s engagement was to provide some form
of oversight, to ensure mechanisms were in place for fair
distribution of benefits and equal opportunity to voice needs from
across the community.  
The three conservation coordinators, who functioned as brokers
between the external project and their community constituency,
represented the major community interests. A primary concern
from the perspective of the Tanimbar Kei representatives was that
the autonomy of the community be acknowledged and
strengthened, not solely in relation to the specific collaboration
with the project on fisheries, but as much for its potential impact
on the broader cultural and administrative landscape. There was
a significant concern among traditional elders and other village
leaders that the customary system could be undermined with the
increasing encroachment of globalization. Neighboring island
communities, that in the past also drew from customary systems
as Tanimbar Kei still does, have since seen many of their traditions
and cultural practices diluted in what many villagers referred to
as modern or cash-driven lifestyles.  
Next to preserving their cultural capital and way of life, the drive
toward securing some form of autonomy was also to counter
external threats that people felt could strip them of their rightful
ownership over the land and sea around the island. Villagers often
referred to cases elsewhere in Indonesia they had heard of where
foreign investors obtained concessions, taking authority away
from communities. Elder respondents also recalled past
experiences with top-down government structures that failed to
recognize any form of local ownership. Gaining security over
access and ownership into the future therefore formed a primary
motivation for engagement with external conservation agencies.  
A secondary objective the community coordinators mentioned as
part of their role in collaborations with external project staff  was
their duty to guide external resources and knowledge into the
village so as to ensure effectivity. As one coordinator noted when
asked what he felt his role was as a mediator between the
community and the project, “We know who is lazy, who works
hard and who is reliable ... so we can best advise which
responsibility to give to whom.” Although such steering is
undoubtedly partial to the coordinators’ subjective judgements,
coordinators noted they were often asked by external NGO staff
during meetings who from the community would be best
appointed for particular tasks.  
The mediating role of the community coordinators was reflected
further in the adjustments to fisheries management interventions
during implementation. Table 1 presents the outcomes of some
of the main interventions of the fisheries management
component, following deliberation of competing external versus
internal interests voiced by project staff  on one hand and the
community coordinators as representatives of Tanimbar Kei
people (the brokers) on the other.
DISCUSSION
Our analysis of results addresses the notion that conservation and
development interventions themselves may contribute to the
creation or maintenance of poverty and feedback to entrench
social-ecological traps (Haider et al. 2018). In their framework
on human responses to SE traps, Boonstra et al. (2016)
incorporate desires, opportunities, and abilities in addition to the
common factor of adaptive capacity as conditions affecting
behavioral responses to resource decline and persisting poverty.
This provides a useful departure point to broaden our
understanding of how interventions end up being implemented
locally, namely by taking into account local interests,
opportunities to induce change, and abilities to guide decision
making and implementation. The outcomes in each part of the
community’s fisheries management plan demonstrate different
brokering actions. In some cases, it is evident that negotiations
between project and community interests occurred and
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Table 1. Overview of mediated program outcomes resulting from differentiated interests between technical facilitating staff  and the
community representatives as part of a locally managed marine area (LMMA) program in Tanimbar Kei, eastern Indonesia. Fisheries
management objectives developed to escape the social-ecological trap appear in the furthest right column.
 
Objective Project interests driven by NGO
facilitation





Provide enabling conditions to
develop local capacity to manage
fisheries so as to safeguard fishery
resources and support local
livelihoods, particularly to enable
resilience to changing conditions,
e.g., climate change.
Strengthen rights over land and sea as
rightful custodians, in the face of concerns
about loss of ownership rights from foreign
investment and government control.
A right-based fisheries management
(RBFM) approach was applied.
Since 2008 Tanimbar Kei gained
subdistrict-level authority that explicitly
mandates management by the Tanimbar
Kei customary community over 40,000





Implementation of an annual
rotational fishery access plan across
defined fishery zones, in order to
control fishing pressure.
To control access of outside fishers;
With exception to small dynamic
customary closures (spatially and
temporally variable), for which compliance
is high because of the social consequences
dictated by custom, such internal control
over the LMMA is less applicable.
Restrictions on access to those fixed fishery
zones do not assume enforcement under
customary law, that supports rightful
access to its seas as a whole for Tanimbar
Kei descendants.
The territory was defined and managed as
one region with no practical enforcement
of internal distinctions between zones in
the territory (despite mention in
management documents).
Sanctions imposed on outsiders only.
#3: Enforcement of
fishing quotas
Regardless of the origin of the
fisher, all catch must be within set
quotas, otherwise sanctions apply.
Outsiders must adhere to local fishery
quotas.
Only outsiders have been apprehended;




Regardless of the origin of the
fisher, no destructive fishing
practices allowed, e.g. bombing,
fish traps, etc., adherence to gear
restrictions, e.g., minimum mesh
size nets, otherwise sanctions apply.
No destructive fishing practices permitted
by anyone (insider or outsider).
Outsiders have been apprehended, often
based on their use of illegal gear/
techniques.
Fishing pressure by villagers was relatively




Regardless of the origin of the
fisher, no endangered species may
be targeted (as defined by national
law); otherwise sanctions apply.
Restrictions on species consumption are
determined by traditional beliefs and
taboos, and vary from community-wide
prohibition to family-based (or even
individual) taboo.
Traditional dietary taboos persisted.
Species under national protection were still
caught for customary adat (traditional)
rituals, e.g., turtle, and these cases were






management, e.g., set up bank
account and transparent
management.
Use of funds suggested to primarily
(1) recycle back into the community
fisheries program to work toward a
financially independent program,
and (2) to contribute to
community-wide livelihood
improvement.
Financial management can be carried out
by traditional leadership or village
government.
Use of funds suggested to primarily recycle
into the community to address peoples’
needs, with allocation managed by
traditional leadership.
A bank account was opened and regular
income from fisher licenses and sanctions
were deposited, with monthly bank
statements displayed on community notice
board.
For the first four years accumulated funds
were not used, because of unclear rules
and sensitivity to potential misuse.
Since then funds have been used on a case
by case basis to help cover education
expenses of households and to provide
aid, e.g., food provisions, to poor
households. Importantly, the NGO has
urged for representation beyond
traditional leaders in decision making
about allocation, so as to avoid biased
allocations (resulting in involvement of
village government staff).
eventuated in midground outcomes. Other cases show how
interventions appear in management documentation as part of
achieving an intended outcome, however are only partially
enforced by community leaders in their implementation. These
strategies show how factors that make interventions sustainable,
i.e., helping people overcome the precarious SE trap they are in,
are as much dependent on being technically accurate as they are
socially compatible (Cumming 2018). We explicate these different
brokering strategies below.
Brokering strategies
The deliberate application of rights-based fisheries management
(RBFM) by the project (objective #1 in Table 1), as an appropriate
fisheries management approach aligns closely with Tanimbar
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Kei’s interest to strengthen their autonomous rights over their
traditional land and sea territory. The first step in achieving this,
namely gaining government endorsement to legitimize
management rights over their territory, represented significant
progress for both external project staff  and community
coordinators, albeit for different reasons. For project staff  gaining
local tenure rights was important, in part as a common principle
for legitimating community resource management (Ostrom 2009,
Allison et al. 2012), but also because it laid a foundation on which
more effective enforcement for fisheries management could be
developed, given that the community could now sanction and
license out fishing rights. For the Tanimbar Kei community this
formal recognition represented strengthening of their
custodianship over a far broader spectrum than just fisheries
management. As one conservation team member argued, “it is
now for the world to know that these are our [Tanimbar Kei]
waters, ... our traditional right is written in government
documents.” RBFM, being their chosen approach to guide
fisheries management, eventually drove the implementation of
the island’s fisheries management plan (objective #2 in Table 1),
largely because of its perceived potential to strengthen both sets
of interests. Another example of where a negotiated middle
ground was reached involved the issue of endangered species
targeting (objective #5 in Table 1). External project staff  argued
for total prohibition of capture. The community consensus,
however, showed resistance to such strict regulation, in part
because some species have always been traditionally consumed as
part of important social events. Brokering by the community
coordinators eventually led to latitude in the prohibition of
endangered species capture. Revised regulation allowed for turtles
to be captured and consumed as long as they were not traded, but
rather used exclusively for consumption as part of a traditionally
associated ceremony.  
Where interventions were formulated that included elements that
did not find local support, only partial enforcement was evident.
Most striking in Tanimbar Kei was the implementation
adjustments around restrictive measures that selectively targeted
subjects of regulation who were socially least affiliated with the
Tanimbar Kei community. For example, in enforcing gear
restrictions and fishing quotas (objectives #3 and 4 in Table 1),
outside fishers from other regions in Indonesia, as well as outside
fishers from villages closer to Tanimbar Kei, were readily
apprehended and sanctioned. Sanctioning fellow fishers from
Tanimbar Kei has to date not occurred. Prohibiting fellow
community members from fishing in a particular area or
sanctioning them for exceeding a quota appeared to conflict
directly with their perceived right to fish as recognized under
Tanimbar Kei’s common customary law. The community
coordinators in these cases adapted implementation of those
particular measures so that fishing practices by fellow Tanimbar
Kei islanders were deemed beyond the scope of fisheries
regulations. This is not written into the management plan, but
appeared to have been accepted by the community management
team, and tolerated by the external facilitating NGO staff  given
there was no corrective response.  
Further evidence of brokerage between conservation agency and
community interests occurred in deliberations about financial
management of income from the fisheries management
component. External project staff  strongly argued for particular
checks and balances to be put in place to ensure fair distribution
of benefits across the whole village. These were explicit measures
to allow benefit distribution to extend beyond the majority
traditional core group made up of households from the founding
23 families. It led to the opening of a bank account instead of
local cash management by the traditional leaders or village
government, information dissemination regarding the balance of
funds in the communal account, and incorporation of community
representatives beyond traditional leaders in decision making
about allocation of funds to aid poor households. The brokers in
this case allowed for external facilitators to have significant say
in establishing local financial management processes.  
The question of why the voice of external project staff  appeared
more readily taken up in this matter versus previous examples
(where brokers took it upon themselves to adjust or implement
measures to suit local social conditions) is interesting. A likely
explanation is the sensitivity associated with managing money.
Past experiences and widespread accounts of corruption of
government project funds has made dealing with communal funds
a highly volatile and sensitive matter. The fact that funds were not
used in the first four years of accumulation supports this claim.
One coordinator explained that “the money was growing in the
bank but we were scared to use it because people might think we
are using it for ourselves ... it is better that someone else decides
how to use it.” Allowing external agents to take partial lead in
advising how to manage funds meant local leaders were less likely
to be blamed for malpractices. This echoes documented
experiences elsewhere where such aspects are seen to be prone to
socio-political biases if  dictated entirely by immersed actors
(Fritzen 2007, Ferrol-Schulte et al. 2015, Warren and Visser 2016).
Influence of external engagements
The above brokering processes and adjustments to interventions
illustrate firsthand the agency that people have in steering a system
(Long 2001), in combination with structural shifts and
institutional bricolage that arise from collective negotiations over
time (Cleaver 2012). Frick-Trzebitzky et al.’s (2017:63) analysis
of the effects of institutional dynamics on human vulnerability
to flood risk reveal similar “mechanisms by which bricolage takes
place, namely by tinkering, transformation and reinvention.” In
that context they specifically refer to the way shifting interests
and priorities reflected differences between actors’ perceptions
and experiences of risk, in much the same way the mediated form
of Tanimbar Kei’s LMMA reflected multiple negotiations.  
Applying language of Boonstra et al. (2016)’s SE trap framework,
our mediation cases show that the brokering ability of
coordinators led in some instances to the partial amendment of
interventions and in other instances to the partial enforcement of
them. Such modifications allowed for sufficient accommodation
of opposing desires to make implementation acceptable. The
establishment of the community LMMA project thus provided
opportunity to address the challenges people faced but also to
channel particular priority interests. Although the amendments
have resulted in an accommodating governance regime, the
question remains to what extent the prospects for addressing the
root challenges to overcome the SE trap they were initially
developed for have been compromised.
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CONCLUSION
We set out to show how external project implementation in itself
can produce trap altering processes (Boonstra et al. 2016, Haider
et al. 2018), and used a case study of a community-based fisheries
management program establishing an LMMA to show how
brokers facilitate institutional adjustments. The outcomes from
fisheries management interventions (Table 1) demonstrate the
agency of these brokers in finding means to make foreign concepts
acceptable locally, and in other cases to adjust implementation of
potentially conflicting measures so as to maintain public support.
Through such agency new ideas have gained presence and value
among older ones, to move the continual institutional growth in
the community in a particular, possibly new, direction. That new
direction is influenced in part by principles of sustainable fisheries
management given impetus by the external project staff. However,
of perhaps greater importance, the new direction reflects a
strengthening of particular existing interests and values that have
found compatibility with project aims that lie in the inherent
motivation and drive toward autonomy and maintenance of the
cultural fabric of the community. Such amalgamations reflect
strongly the rejigging and ongoing patchwork that Cleaver (2012)
refers to with the concept of institutional bricolage. The dynamic
processes involved in implementation appear then to form
feedback loops that alter arrangements and interactions, similar
to those identified in interactions between components of social-
ecological systems. The act of intervening with the intention of
achieving a directed impact in itself  then appears to produce
significant change, in this case, well beyond predefined project
bounds.  
The experiences of implementing fisheries management around
the community LMMA shows how particular measures are
shaped from theoretical conception, only to be reshaped during
their practical implementation so as to gain salience in a local
social-ecological context. Recognizing this, reinforces that a priori
design of resource management strategies simply cannot be rigid
(Janssen and Ostrom 2006, Armitage et al. 2008). At best these
strategies can set out guide posts that indicate the general right
pathway out of a SE trap, but by no means can prescribe that
path. Therefore focus on process and continual recognition of
feedback loops that occur as interventions gain local shape is
imperative in guiding how people can escape SE traps as far as
possible on their terms (Boonstra et al. 2016). It is promising that
the literature on fisheries comanagement already recognizes
opportunity in hybridization of practices that draw from both
Western science-based principles and customary practices
(Pomeroy and Andrew 2011, Cohen and Steenbergen 2015).
Technical fisheries managers need to expand their conservation
and development brief  in order to achieve synergistic
accommodations with local norms, practices, and beliefs. To do
so they must match their approach with those of a specific kind
of local broker (Cleaver’s “institutional bricoleur”) who is
sufficiently grounded locally to be able to juxtapose, translate,
and construct a common agenda in a process aimed at
institutional progression with which local people can identify.  
Beyond building on a theory of how SE traps develop and how
poor people can escape them, we have argued for the need to direct
attention to processes rather than solely to outputs.
Implementation processes are all too often still taken for granted
in theory (Cleaver 2001), in the same way that projects are still all
too often judged for success by predefined outputs. Considering
the dynamics illustrated in the case study, conservation and
development initiatives stand to gain more support at local level
by aligning with the social and political relationships people
already have, rather than promoting an abstract and narrow moral
justification and technical model for doing things sustainably.
Investment in identifying appropriate brokers and enabling them
to facilitate processes of institutional bricolage will do much to
bring together technical knowledge of how to escape SE traps
with better understandings of how things get done on the ground.
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